ON January 31, 1962 – 50 years ago – an event which had been brewing for nine months was finally consummated. It would later be known as "the only moment in history when the world was on the brink of nuclear war." (1)

The prologue to this conflict was the 8th Consultation Meeting of Foreign Relations Ministers of the region, created by the United States diplomatic corps to strangle Cuba’s new government. The Berlin Wall, and everything else, was overshadowed by Kennedy’s desire to avenge the family’s honor, lost in the Bay of Pigs. Overthrowing Castro was the U.S. government’s first priority, according to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, when he spoke with CIA Director John McCone, January 19, 1962. (2)

In December 1961, the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Permanent Committee convoked this 8th Conference of Foreign Ministers, requested by the Colombian government invoking the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty. Colombian Minister Julio César Turbay Ayala had been truly disturbed to find himself among the 81 passengers aboard a DC-8 which, after taking off from Mexico City, was hijacked to Havana. Ironically, for several days prior to the incident, he had been traveling around the region gathering support for the anti-Cuban Conference. Apparently, turning back an invasion organized by the United States had made the island country a threat. Ayala could breathe easier when Fidel Castro and Raúl Roa appeared at Havana airport and treated him with all due respect given his position.

"My interview with Castro in Havana has given me the impression that, in a somewhat curious way, Cuba's international relations have improved," he declared to UPI in Miami. Nevertheless, four months later, Turbay alleged as a reason to expel Cuba, an "intervention by extra-continental powers in the region."

Thus, from January 22 through 31, 1962, the meeting in Punto del Este, Uruguay, constituted a continuation of U.S. machinations to nip the Cuban Revolution in the bud. The intrigue had begun as early as December, 1958, when the Eisenhower administration realized that the Rebel Army was about to defeat the Batista dictatorship. "Washington was making confidential contacts with OAS ambassadors, urging them to pressure the rebels and the Batista regime, so that a moderate government could assume power." (3). The maneuvers continued into 1959 itself during the 5th OAS meeting in Santiago de Chile, followed in 1960 by the 6th and 7th in San José, Costa Rica.

The gaudy, exclusive beach resort in Punta del Este turned out to be an ideal venue for the U.S. objectives to be met. It was at a distance from the capital, visited by rich Argentine tourists and well-off Uruguayans, thus ensuring that the combatitive Uruguayan people would not interfere. However, it was only a partial victory for the organizers. Uruguayan workers made use of resources available to make their presence known, despite the restrictions. They marched on foot from Montevideo to Punta del Este, attracting a lot of attention days prior to the event. A giant banner of solidarity from the people expressed, all along the route to Punto del Este, that the people were on Cuba's side.

In the 8th OAS meeting, Cuba was excluded from future participation with nine resolutions, including one condemning the country, given "the presence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which publicly identifies with the doctrines and foreign policy of Communist powers." The group deemed this "doctrine" as incompatible with the inter-American system, thus expelling Cuba from the OAS and the inter-American defense command. There were 14 votes in favor, one against (Cuba), with the majority of the most important Latin American countries abstaining: Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador.

The Argentine delegation asserted that the proposed application of coercive measures against Cuba was illegal, without prior authorization by the United Nations Security Council.

But President Kennedy was intent upon putting an end to the Cuban Revolution, although he wasn’t willing to send in U.S. troops to prevent the triumph of communism in Cuba, as his military advisors and extremists in both parties recommended. He had resisted their pressure to intervene directly during the Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs) debacle, but he had ordered the Defense Department to prepare a plan against Cuba to mitigate the torrent of Republican criticism, especially that of Senator Barry Goldwater, who was looking to succeed him as President. In a memorandum to McNamara he directed the open utilization of U.S. military forces, as Nixon had proposed. (4)

Nevertheless, and for two important reasons, the support of the Soviet Union and its leader Nikita Khrushchev, and the fear of unleashing protest in Latin America, the U.S. had to proceed cautiously. Thus, Kennedy commissioned Presidential advisor Richard Goodwin to work on the ‘Cuba issue’ and seek support for the U.S. position among Latin American governments, while at the same time preparing to launch the multi-faceted Operation Mongoose which included terrorist plots and economic sanctions. Trapped in this duality, Kennedy admitted to journalist Tad Szulc that he was being pressured to approve the assassination of Fidel and asked him his opinion. The CIA had already been in touch with the Italian-American mafia about carrying out such a criminal attack.

Peru’s proposal for a meeting to discuss anti-Cuba measures had been rejected since it was discussed in the OAS Council, by six countries plus Cuba. Another proposal by Colombia was approved in December, 1961, two days after Fidel had declared the Revolution’s socialist nature.

Kennedy met in Palm Beach on December 24 with Argentine President Frondizi who was attempting to play a mediating role, recommending negotiations. Frondizi thought that discussing sanctions against Cuba in a meeting would have repercussions within Argentina and affect the elections scheduled for March 1962. The Cuban question was becoming an internal problem for him, with pressure coming from both supporters and detractors of Cuba. Kennedy urged him to support the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS.

During the 8th Consultation Meeting of Foreign Relations Ministers, Frondizi did not align Argentina with the United States, but rather abstained along with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. The Argentine military command demanded that Frondizi break off diplomatic relations with Cuba, as its members had been insisting since 1960, and the President complied on February 8, 1962. This did not, however, prevent him from being ousted. Washington did not allow any exceptions. The presidents of Brazil and Bolivia and Ecuador were all subsequently removed, as well.

Resolution No. 6, adopted in Punto del Este, has served for years as the primary justification for maintaining sanctions against Cuba, euphemistically called an embargo, as a result of its alliance with the Soviet Union, despite the fact that that country has long ceased to exist and the OAS itself has rejected Cuba’s alleged "incompatibility."

(1) Miami Herald. 05/29/11

(2 ) Tim Weiner, Legado de Cenizas. La historia de la CIA. Random House Mondadori. Tercera Edición. P.189

(3) John Dorschner & Roberto Fabricio. The Winds of December. Coward, McCann & Geoghegan New York 1980. P.190

(4) Jim Rasenberger. Brilliant Disaster. Simon and Schuster. New York 2011. P317 .