Political Prisoners of the Empire  MIAMI 5      

     

N A T I O N A L

Havana. September 27, 2005

TRANSPORTATION

In this period, the blockade has cost Cuba $ 182,048,000 in the area of transportation.

To illustrate how this sector has been affected, suffice it to point out that the vehicles and motors used in Havana’s Metrobus service, chiefly of US make, had to be purchased through an intermediary. With the $ 795,642 which were paid in excess to purchase 98 vehicles in the period under analysis, another 62 vehicles could have been purchased; coupled with the $ 567,978 paid extra because the needed spare pieces could not be directly purchased from the United States, this could have allowed Cuba to increase its public transportation services by 30 %.

The blockade has cost Cuban railway services $ 22,487,560. Considering the fact that nearly 1,200,000 US tourists could have visited us in this period and that 12 % of these would have travelled via FERROCUBA from the capital to various destinations around the country, Cuba’s railway company would have taken in around $ 3,409,600, money it could have used to repair some 10 locomotives that offer national and coach services.

With respect to problems affecting the national railway network, since 50 % of trains use locomotives that were manufactured in the United States and have over 30 years of operation, employing obsolete technology and needing spare pieces that are difficult to obtain, and since the high risks of operating these locomotives involve additional spending, Cuba has lost 433,736 customers and has been unable to transport 587,194 tons of load during this period, the equivalent of $ 19,077,960.

With the $ 182,048,000 mentioned above as the total lost in this sector during the year, some of the following needs could have been met:

- Replace and obtain new buses for Havana’s public transportation system, incorporating 679 regular and 600 articulated buses (the latter to completely replace metrobuses). This would cost a total of $ 181,100,000.

- Construct the still unfinished stretches of the Havana – Santiago de Cuba highway, including intersections with other roads ($ 160,200,000); in Havana, replace traffic lights, pave and signpost roads, among other things ($ 25,000,000, approximately).

2.2 Impact on other sectors of the domestic economy

No sector of the Cuban economy has managed to escape the hardship caused by the blockade.

Between 2004 and 30 April 2005, the total loss to the civil aviation sector reached 178 million 61 thousand 459 dollars. The total amount of damage incurred since 1960 rose to 2 thousand 400 million dollars.

In this period, the income lost through the non-rendering of airport services and others, due to the travel ban imposed on US citizens, totaled 152 million 234 thousand 987 dollars. Between 1960 and April 2005, a total of 2 thousand 43 million 167 thousand 229 dollars have been lost in this way. Due to the additional travel bans, in effect since 30 June 2004, the American aircrafts that should have operated in our airports have not done so, which has produced economic losses to the extent of 3 million 537 thousand 384 dollars.

In the light industry, damaged caused by the increase in prices and overspending on freightage totaled $12. 402 800. With this sum it would have possible to double the amount of toilet and household soap given to the population as part of their quota of household items, as well as a 48.7% increase in the amount of toothpaste.

As a result of the blockade, the Iron and Steel Industry Group, ACINOX, which imports and exports products of iron and steel industries and electrical conductors, looses a yearly sum of 12 million dollars, which could be used to produce 45 thousand tons of corrugated rods. This would make it possible to build 180 thousand rural dwellings a year, or more than 30 thousand pre-fabricated houses, which would benefit 120 thousand people. Likewise, with the aforementioned amount of corrugated rods, it would be possible to completely repair, in 10 years, the 200 thousand homes which are currently in need in Havana, thus benefiting 180 thousand people.

The oil companies with business in Cuba that invested in the country in 2004, spent 163 million dollars. Of this amount, 25% came from overspending on parts and materials that could not be bought on the American market and on the additional payment of freightage, all of which totaled an overpayment of 40 million dollars. If it had not been necessary to make this overpayment, it would have been possible to reduce the import of oil to the country by 500 thousand tons as a result of the increase in national production.

The natural market for the sale of Cuban produced petrol would be the United States. If the Cienfuegos Refinery were to start production, it would be possible, if this country were to end the blockade, to export 600 thousand tons a year, which at today’s prices is equal to 210 million dollars.

With regard to nickel, the United States import an average of approximately 130 thousand tons of this primary metal every year. If there were no blockade – and taking into account the fact that due to its proximity to the United States, Cuba would provide the ideal source of supply of the mineral to this country-, the Island could sell more than 30 thousand tons of nickel a year to the United States, which at today’s prices would represent more than 500 million dollars. In respect of cobalt, the United States imports around 8 thousand tons of this metal every year. If they were to import just 25% of this cobalt from Cuba – 2 thousand tons a year – at today’s prices Cuba could make more than 66 million dollars.

The Mechanical Nickel Company had to acquire welding and CNC (computerised numerical control machinery) equipment produced by the US manufacturer MILLER, and a CNC Challenger Thermadyne machine, also made in the United States, via third parties. These transactions made through middlemen cost a total of $363 500 dollars and represent an additional payment of $54 500.

The Cuban steel company, ‘Antillana de Acero’, makes 80% of its purchases in the European markets and pays in euros, thus producing a loss of more than 25% due the exchange of currency. One thousand tons of coal are used every month in the smelting process. This coal is bought in Colombia, at a cost of $300 per ton; if Antillana could do business with UCAR, an American company with which we would transact to buy the best C/G electrode available, this raw material would not cost a penny, thanks to the commitments that UCAR makes with its purchasers.

Taking in to account the fact that in 1958 Cuban sugar represented 58.2% of the total amount of imports of this product to the United States, it is estimated that, provided that it had maintained a similar proportion of the market, the negative impact for the Cuban economy due to not being able to place said product on the American market, rose last year to 154.1 million dollars. The difference between the average price at which Cuba had to sell its sugar last year and the price that it would have got if it had been able to sell it in the United States was US $249.1 per metric ton.

Between April 2004 and March 2005, losses in the tourism sector rose to 1043 million dollars. With 80 million dollars it would have been possible to build two five-star hotels with 500 rooms each (25 million dollars for each hotel) and to reconstruct 3 thousand rooms that have deteriorated due to the passing of time and insufficient maintenance attributable to the lack of resources (30 million dollars, using 10 million per room)

Each year the tourism sector spends almost 500 million dollar on electricity. It is estimated that the source of between 50% and 60% of this consumption is the use air conditioning the facilities. It is also calculated that the most competitive air-conditioning units from the United States can produce a saving of at least 10% in comparison with those from other manufacturing countries. If it had been possible to invest in the acquisition of US air-conditioning units, the electricity saved could have been to the amount of 30 million dollars a year.

As regards housing, one of the country’s most pressing problems, the fact that it is impossible to acquire building materials from American companies or affiliates in the area increases the cost of construction by an average of 35%.

Because of the blockade interior commerce transactions incurred additional expenses of 66.8 million dollars, largely due to the cost of freightage and purchases made through third parties. Without these additional costs it would have been possible to buy 90 thousand condenser units for premises where milk and meat products are sold at retail prices, which would solve refrigeration problems in these establishments. It would also have been possible to buy 500 thousand motor compressors to be used to repair domestic refrigerators, thus responding to the needs of the population in this field.

The limitations in the culture sector continue. It is difficult for Cuban musicians to perform in the American market. Because of the high demand for performances by Cuban artists in the USA, the Cuban company ARTEX could make a minimum of 9 million dollars a year. At least one million dollars would have entered the country through the sale of CDs, DVDs and other products.

It is likewise impossible for Cuban filmmakers to present their productions to important audiovisual markets in the United States, thus seriously affecting the sales that could be made in these areas. One example of this is the AMERICAN FILM MARKET, which is considered to be the first or second most important film market in existence today; due to the fact that the Cuban film industry cannot offer its products over there, it has lost out on 500 thousand dollars.

There are American producers and directors who are interested in filming in Cuba, but who are unable to do so because of the bans imposed by the blockade. Well-known examples of this – individuals who had specific projects linked to our setting and wished to realise them– are Steven Spielberg, Steven Soderberg, Randa Haines and Danny Glover. A conservative estimate of the income that the country could have received if an average budget American movie were to be filmed would be to the amount of 2 to 5 million dollars. If at least 2 of these projects had been realised, the income to the country would have totaled between 4 and 10 million dollars, enough to finance the filming of a total of 50 feature-length animations, at an average cost of 200 thousand dollars, or a total of 400 short-length animations for Cuban children.

The fact that the blockade prohibits Cuban companies from having recourse to the US dollar in international business transactions, has meant a loss for the company EGREM of 57 thousand dollars due to the exchange of currency, during the period in question.

Companies from this sector were also significantly affected in the sense that it was hard for them to acquire supplies as important as paint, the complete spectrum of tempera colours, oils and acrylics, materials used to prepare easels and other items, because they had to be bought in Europe. An example of this is the Cuban Fund for Cultural Assets, which incurred excess payments of 19 thousand US dollars as a result of having to buy supplies on the European market. Well known American companies that produce high quality goods, such as Windsor & Newton Gallery Acrylics, offer retail prices for their products that are usually up to three times lower than what Cuba has to pay when making this type of purchase in Europe.

At the end of 2004, as a result of a proposal by American university publishing houses interested in facilitating the free exchange of ideas and informative material with Cuba, the OFAC added a General License for editorial work to the list of regulations on the control of Cuban assets. This License would make it possible to authorise persons and companies from the United States to take part in editorial work related to Cuba and in other activities that favour relations in this field. However, the application of this measure was subjected to restrictions that once again evidenced the hostility of the US authorities towards the Cuban Revolution, in a blatant act of disdain for the free flow of ideas and artistic creations.

The aforementioned General License explicitly prohibits transactions with the ‘Cuban Government’, and with institutions which, according to the OFAC, ‘belong to the Cuban Government’. The least that can be expected with regards the application of this License is a long and complicated process, during which the punitive mechanisms created by the blockade which have been applied for decades, will continue to cause considerable damage to the Cuban editorial sector.

The following are examples of the ways in which the activity of the Literary Latin American Agency has been impeded, and illustrate the facts given above:

- The Smithsonian Editorial, based in New York, had prepared a project for the bilingual and illustrated edition of the work City of Pillars’, to be launched in 2004 in tribute to the centenary of Alejo Carpentier, the Cuban author and Cervantes Prize laureate. The project was suspended indefinitely by the OFAC, and as yet it has not been possible to realize it.

- The edition of the ‘encyclopedia of Cuban Music’, by the musicologist, Radamés Giró, planned by the university publishing house, Temple University Press – one of the driving forces behind the aforementioned General License -, has also been interrupted due to the ban imposed by US authorities.

For these and other reasons, the Latin American Literary Agency has lost approximately 20 thousand dollars through cancelled editing projects, while a similar figure is pending payment and cannot be received by our country due to the banking restrictions implemented by the financial siege on Cuba.

During the period in question, only 11 travel visas to the United States were issued for cultural purposes, and were given for 5 exchange programmes, out of a total of 106 requests made to the US Interests Section in Havana (USINT) This is a appreciable decrease in comparison to previous years.

Other important examples of this are the cases of the artist, Carlos Garaicoa, who was denied a visa to attend an important exhibition of his work on 4 March in the Contemporary Art Museum in Los Angeles, and of the creators of the Carpinteros group, who were unable to be at the opening of their most important exhibition in the United States on 7 April, which was to take place at the Contemporary Art Museum of the University of South Florida, in Tampa.

The fact that the Cuban representatives of the exhibition fair, the American Book Sellers Association Convention and Trade Exhibition Book Expo America, in which we have been represented without fail since 1994, were prohibited from attending, is another example of the intensification of the blockade in the cultural sector. In March 2004, Cuba was prevented from attending the 1st Congress of Genealogists, when their visa request was not answered.

The refusal to grant visas to the majority of Cuban artists who wish to travel to the United States is the product of a crude and offensive manipulation of cultural relations between Cuban and the United States by authorities in Washington. The pretext for this refusal is the application of clause 212-F of the US migratory regulations, and goes as far as to describe the Cuban artists as ‘a danger to the interests of the United States’.

During the period in question, this clause was applied against dozens of Cuban artists and intellectuals such as the prominent filmmakers Gerardo Chijona Valdés, Fernando Pérez Valdés, Enrique Colina and Rigoberto López Pego; the journalist and filmmaker Lisette Villa; the musicians Carlos Varela and his group as well as the group Habana Sax, as well as other important exponents of Cuban culture, who have been unable to participate in presentations and events in the United States.

The rules of the blockade affected the investment made to set up Educational Channel 2 on Cuban television, which is used for educational purposes and also to increase the population’s knowledge. The total loss to the investment totaled 863 thousand dollars, of which 154 thousand were spent on additional transportation costs and 709 thousand represented excess prices that Cuba had to pay in third party markets.

The exportation of radio and television programmes suffered losses to the sum of 250 thousand dollars, as our products could not be sold to a significant part of the Spanish speaking market which is dominated by US monopolies and interests.

The difficulties that had arisen in previous years regarding the use of S.W.I.F.T. (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) in the communication network persisted for the Central Bank of Cuba. Due to the changes made to the SWIFT Net technological infrastructure in 2004, it was still difficult to import and use the equipment and encryption software (components of the SWIFT security system whose sources are in the United States) which must be employed in order to make use of the SWIFT Net services.

Between 1 and 7 July, the only possible alternative was for Cuba to connect its banks through a Services Bureau in Panama, and acquire the SWIFT Alliance Access product as a Shared license (for concurrent use of our banks), still with a proprietary interface completely redesigned and implemented in accordance with the IP communication and PKI security standards.

In order to continue using the services offered by this system, it was necessary to resort to other measures that have meant:

Not being able to use the software produced by the Central Bank of Cuba, which was approved by SWIFT and used by all Cuban banks for over 12 years.

Having to acquire another type of software for every bank connected to SWIFT, arriving at a cost of 181 thousand 926 dollars, which also makes these banks dependent on the technical services of another entity through the payment of an annual license worth 55 thousand 471 dollars.

The need to use the services of a third party based in another country in order to gain external connection, which costs an annual total of 93 thousand 900 dollars.

In short, as a direct economic expense alone, the banking system, in the field concerned with communication for different operations and transactions with countries abroad, suffered losses between mid 2004 and May 2005 to the amount of 331 thousand 296 dollars.

In the electricity sector, it has been necessary to accept short-term credit to modernise the country’s generating plants and electricity networks, with a view to improving the quality of the service rendered to the population, due to the fact that it was impossible to request the services of the main international credit institutions. The cost of credit gained rose by 6 million dollars.

(Continued... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)

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